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This paper provides a comprehensive factual overview on the German foreign 
direct investment in China. Furthermore, the entry-mode decisions of German-
invested companies are examined, combined with and clarified by an analysis of 
the obstacles those companies face in the Chinese economic and business 
framework today. A profound survey conducted by the German Industry & 
Commerce China (GIC) in 2007 among German-invested companies of 
different legal forms in China is used for this purpose. The paper in hand 
concludes with general suggestions about policy changes that would further 
streamline the operations not only for German-invested companies. 
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China’s outstanding development continuing for more than three decades since 
the renewal of the Chinese global orientation and economy-driven policy 
decisions has been examined meticulously by scholars worldwide from its very 
beginning. The curiosity of the developed and settled economies of the Western 
hemisphere, however, has never been limited to mere academic issues only. 
Taking part in the thriving growth of the huge nation does not only mean taking 
advantage of the country-specific low cost labor force, which usually vanishes 
in rapidly developing countries with increasing prosperity. Furthermore, access 
to a market of more than 1.3 billion consumers, not including large neighboring 
nations like India, Pakistan and Russia is a winning argument to foreign 
companies.  
Germany is one of the economic most active and important countries in Europe 
and built strong ties with China as early as in the beginning of the 19th century. 
The initiation of China’s open door policy fostered the relations and today, 
Germany is China’s most important economic partner in the European 
economic zone. German capital is attracted by the factors mentioned above and 
shows a growing inflow to China. This paper provides a comprehensive factual 
view on these relations. A broad analysis of the FDI flows from Germany, to 
China, and most importantly from Germany to China is conducted. Furthermore, 
obstacles to German-invested companies, their choice of entry mode in China 
and respective outlooks are examined with the help of results from a survey 
conducted by the Germany Industry & Commerce China (GIC) from 2007. 
 
2. General situation of investment 
Elaborating on the concerns and discontent of business partners on both the 
German as well as the Chinese sides later on requires a profound analysis of the 
development of investment transactions from Germany and towards China. This 















impact of political changes of the frameworks in which companies in both 
countries have been acting.  
 
2.1 FDI to China 
Historically, China attracted foreign money for centuries. Despite having had 
isolated itself for a long period, China’s trade flourished from time to time. 
Apparently, even before Captain Benjamin Wood got lost on his journey to 
China 1596 and Captain Weddell finally succeeded in 1637, yet did not 
establish trade relations, the Portuguese landed in Macao in 1557 and soon 
afterwards in Amoy and other spots along the coastline to the North3. During 
the 19th century, many industrialized western countries, headed by the already 
highly industrialized United Kingdom of Great Britain with its colony India 
were interested in the new market of potentially hundreds of millions of Chinese. 
Unfortunately, the huge cultural differences as well as the comparable 
underdevelopment of China at this point resulted in unsatisfying sales of 
imported products Chinese either could not afford, could substitute with cheaper 
domestic goods or simply had no need for. Nonetheless, the foreign merchants 
exported tea, silk and other specific Chinese products. A forced replacement of 
the former article of exchange, silver coins “taels” with opium resulted in drug 
addiction and the boxer uprisings. 
After the end of World War II, Máo Zédōng led the People’s Republic of China 
which had formerly been oppressed and ruled by foreigners for about a century 
to a new autonomy, however, at the cost of isolation, leading to economic 
deterioration. Only after his death, China gathered new strength to open itself to 
the world. This decision can, as of today, be seen as most beneficial to both 
China, having been growing in GDP at high rates of even two digits, and its 
trade partners, profiting from China’s probably most competitive advantage, its 
extensive and cheap labor force. 
                                             















Since economic data was paradoxically either scarce or manipulated during the 
time of the rigidly planned economy of Máo Zédōng, this unreliable information 
can largely not be used as a source of facts to do research on. Today, the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China publishes the China Statistical Yearbook 
as most genuine source of statistical investigations in China at regular intervals. 
Besides, the World Bank provides with the World Development Indicators 
Database a comprehensive database of historical and current economic data 
which for this paper will also be used for comparison (see Figure 1: Different 
foreign direct investment statistics sources (1982 – 2005)).  
  
Figure 1: Different foreign direct investment statistics sources (1982 – 2005) 
Sources: World Development Indicators Database, National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 
 
According to the first set of consistent surveys on the foreign capital investment 
inflow to China conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 















until 1997 up to over USD 52 billion (see Figure 2: Chinese foreign direct 
investment (1994 – 2006)). Notably, the foreign direct investment did not 
experience continuous growth during the years 1997-2000. During that period, 
many Asian countries, belonging to the “tiger” and “panther” countries faced a 
severe financial, economic and currency-related downturn as a result of excess 
investment, borrowing in foreign currencies, balance of trade deficits as well as 
weak regional financial market structures4.  
 
Figure 2: Chinese foreign direct investment (1994 – 2006) 
         Source: China Statistical Yearbook all issues from 1996 to 2007 
 
This crisis had negative influence also on the Chinese FDI despite the fact that 
China itself was not affected to the same extent as other countries. The drop in 
FDI in some ASEAN member states was even misleadingly blamed on China’s 
FDI attraction combined with the false assumption of a zero-sum of FDI inflows 
to the East-Asian region. During this period, the seven countries suffering the 
most under the crises, Thailand, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Japan held a share of 20 per cent of the FDI flows 
to China (see Table 1: FDI flows to China from countries affected during the 
                                             















Asian crisis of 1997/1998 (1994 – 2001), in billion USD). While the total of 
FDI inflows to China during the time from 1998 through 2000 decreased by 24 
per cent, those seven countries’ share dropped by 30 per cent. All seven 
countries considerably decreased their engagement in China in form of foreign 
investment (see Figure 3: change in FDI flow to China by country (1995 - 
2001)). While the larger investors, namely Japan, Singapore and the Republic of 
Korea reacted more or less in a concerted manner (see Figure 4: FDI to China 
of the three major investors to China affected by the Asian crisis (1994 – 2001)), 
the four countries with FDI below USD 500 million (Indonesia, Thailand, The 
Philippines, and Malaysia) reacted heterogeneously. Nonetheless, investment 
activities from there also declined sharply during the period of the crisis (see 
Figure 5: FDI to China of the four least important investors to China affected 
by the Asian crisis (1994 – 2001)).  
 
Figure 3: change in FDI flow to China by country (1995 - 2001) 
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